Management and the World’s Work

This “essay+” contains multiple broad thoughtscapeS → awareness and horizons to work toward ↓

... in an unpredictable world with the unimagined futureS that follow (tomorrowS ain’t going to be like yesterdayS or todayS)

It is impossible to work toward things that aren’t on your mental radar at the right point in time

«§§§»

In each thought area ↓ Ask → what does this mean for me?

by Peter Drucker a political/social ecologist

The basic material below is contained in Peter Drucker on the Profession of Management published by Harvard Business School Press.

I’ve tried to make it easier to perceive (see) and connect to other areas of thought – thought-scapeS or mental landscapes.
When Marx was beginning work on *Das Kapital* in the early 1850s, the phenomenon of management was unknown. So were the enterprises that managers run. ↓

The largest manufacturing company around was a Manchester, England cotton mill employing fewer than 300 people, owned by Marx’s friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels.

And in Engels’s mill—one of the most profitable businesses of its day there were no “managers,” only first-line supervisors, or charge hands, who were workers themselves, each enforcing discipline over a handful of fellow “proletarians.” ¶¶¶

Rarely in human history has any institution emerged as fast as management or had as great an impact as quickly.

In less than 150 years, management has transformed the social and economic fabric of the world’s developed countries.
It has *created* a global economy and *set new rules* for countries that would *participate* in that economy as *equals*.

**The new pluralism**

And it has *itself (management)* been transformed.

To be sure, the *fundamental task* of management remains the same: to *make people capable of joint performance* by giving them

- common goals,
- common values,
- the right structure, and
- the ongoing training and development they *need* to *perform* and to *respond to change*.

But the very *meaning of this task has changed*, if only because the *performance of management* has *converted* the *work force* from one *composed* largely of unskilled laborers to one of *highly educated knowledge workers*.

Few executives are aware of the *tremendous impact management* has had.

Indeed, a good many are like M. Jourdain, the character in Molière’s *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who did not know that he spoke prose.

They barely realize that they practice—or mispractice—management.

**As a result, they are ill prepared for the tremendous challenges** that come upon them.

For the truly important problems managers face do not come from technology or politics.

They do not originate outside of management and enterprise.

They are problems caused by *the very success of management itself*. 
Eighty years ago, on the threshold of World War I, when a few people were just becoming aware of management’s existence, most people in developed countries (perhaps four out of every five) earned their living in three occupations.

There were domestic servants—in Great Britain, the largest single occupation (a full third of all workers), but a very large group everywhere, even in the United States.

There were farmers—usually family farmers, who accounted for more than half the working population in every country except England and Belgium.

And finally, there were blue-collar workers in manufacturing industries—the fastest growing occupation and the one that by 1925 would embrace almost 40 percent of the U.S. labor force.

Today domestic servants have all but disappeared.

Full-time farmers account for only 3 percent to 5 percent of the working population in the non-Communist, developed countries, even though farm production is four to five times what it was 80 years ago.

Blue-collar manufacturing employment is rapidly moving down the same path as farming.

Manual workers employed in manufacturing in the United States now make up only 18 percent of the total work force; by the end of the century, they are likely to account for 10 percent or so in the United States and elsewhere—with manufacturing production steadily rising and expected to be at least 50 percent higher.

The largest single group, more than one-third of the total, consists of workers whom the U.S. Bureau of the Census calls “managerial and professional.”

And a larger proportion of the total adult population than ever before—almost two-thirds in the United States, for instance—is now gainfully employed in every developed, non-Communist country.

Management has been the main agent of this unprecedented transformation.

For it is management that explains why, for the first time in human history, we can employ large numbers of knowledgeable, skilled people in productive work.
No earlier society could do this.

Indeed, no earlier society could support more than a handful of such people because, until quite recently, no one knew how to put people with different skills and knowledge together to achieve common goals.

Eighteenth century China was the envy of contemporary Western intellectuals because it supplied more jobs for educated people than all of Europe did—some 20,000 per year.

Yet today, the United States with a roughly comparable population produces nearly one million college graduates a year, most of whom have little difficulty finding well-paid employment.

What enables us to employ them is management.  

Knowledge, especially advanced knowledge, is always highly specialized.

By itself it produces nothing.

Yet a modern large business can usefully employ up to 10,000 highly knowledgeable people who possess up to 60 different fields of knowledge.

Engineers of all sorts, designers, marketing experts, economists, statisticians, psychologists, planners, accountants, human resources people—all work together in a joint venture, and none would be effective without the managed enterprise that is business.

The question of which came first—the educational explosion of the last 100 years or the management that could put this knowledge to productive use—is moot.

Modern management and modern enterprise clearly could not exist without the knowledge base that developed societies have built.

But equally, it is management and management alone that makes all this knowledge and these knowledgeable people effective.

The emergence of management has converted knowledge from a social ornament and luxury into what we now know to be the true capital of any economy.

And knowledge, in turn—instead of bricks and mortar—has become the center of capital investment.

Japan invests a record 8 percent of its annual GNP in plant and equipment.
But Japan invests at least twice as much in education, two-thirds in schools for the young, the rest in the training and teaching of adults (largely in the organizations that employ them).

And the United States puts an even larger share roughly 20 percent–of its much larger GNP into education and training.

In the modern society of enterprise and management, knowledge is the primary resource and society’s true wealth.

“Because the knowledge society perforce has to be a society of organizations, its central and distinctive organ is management.”

Not many business leaders could have predicted this development back in 1870, when large enterprises like those we know today were beginning to take shape.

The reason was not so much lack of foresight as lack of precedent.

At that time, the only large permanent organization around was the army.

Not surprisingly, therefore, its command-and-control structure became the model for the men who were putting together transcontinental railroads, steel mills, modern banks, and department stores.

The command model, with a very few at the top giving orders and a great many at the bottom obeying them, remained the norm for nearly 100 years.

But it was never as static as its longevity might suggest.

On the contrary, it began to change almost at once, as specialized knowledge of all sorts poured into enterprise.

The first university-trained engineer in manufacturing industry was hired in Germany in 1867, and within five years he had built a research department.

Other specialties followed suit, and by World War I the familiar typical functions of a manufacturer had been developed:

research and engineering,
manufacturing,
sales,
finance and accounting,

and a little later, human resources.

Even more important for its impact on enterprise—and on the world economy in general—was another management-directed development that took place at this time.

That was the application of management to manual work in the form of training.

The child of wartime necessity, training has propelled the transformation of the world economy in the last 30 years because it allows low-wage countries to do something that traditional economic theory had said could never be done: to become efficient—and yet still low-wage competitors almost overnight.

Until World War I, it was axiomatic that it took a long time (Adam Smith said several hundred years) for a country or region to develop a tradition of labor and the expertise in manual and organizational skills needed to produce and market a given product, whether cotton textiles or violins.

But during World War I, large numbers of totally unskilled, preindustrial people had to be made productive workers in practically no time.

To meet this need, businesses in the United States and the United Kingdom began to apply Frederick Taylor’s principles of “scientific management,” developed between 1885 and 1910, to the systematic training of blue-collar workers on a large scale.

They analyzed tasks and broke them down into individual, unskilled operations that could then be learned quite quickly.

Further developed in World War II, training was then picked up by the Japanese and, 20 years later, by the South Koreans, who made it the basis for their countries’ phenomenal development.

During the 1920s and 1930s, management was applied to many more areas and aspects of manufacturing business.

Decentralization, for instance, arose to combine the advantages of bigness and the advantages of smallness within one enterprise.

Accounting went from “bookkeeping” to analysis and control.

Planning grew out of the “Gantt charts” designed in 1917 and 1918 to plan war production, and so did the use of analytical logic and
statistics, which used quantification to convert experience and intuition into definitions, information, and diagnosis.

Marketing similarly evolved as a result of applying management concepts to distribution and selling.

Moreover, as early as the mid-1920s and early 1930s, some management pioneers (Thomas Watson, Sr. at the fledgling IBM, General Robert E. Wood at Sears, Roebuck, and Elton Mayo at the Harvard Business School among them) began to question the way that manufacturing was organized.

Eventually, they concluded that the assembly line was a short-term compromise despite its tremendous productivity: poor economics because of its inflexibility, poor use of human resources, even poor engineering.

And so they began the thinking that eventually led to “automation” as the way to organize the manufacturing process, and to “Theory Y,” teamwork, quality circles, and the information-based organization as the way to manage human resources.

Every one of these managerial innovations represented the application of knowledge to work, the substitution of system and information for guesswork, brawn, and toil.

Every one, to use Frederick Taylor’s terms, replaced “working harder” with “working smarter.”

The powerful effect of these changes became apparent during World War II.

To the very end, the Germans were by far the better strategists.

And because they had the benefit of much shorter interior lines, they needed far fewer support troops and could match their opponents in combat strength.

Yet the Allies won—their victory achieved by management.

The United States, with one-fifth the population, had almost as many men in uniform as all the other belligerents together.

Yet it still produced more war material than all the others taken together.

And it managed to get that material to fighting fronts as far apart as China, Russia, India, Africa, and Western Europe.

No wonder, then, that by the war’s end almost all the world had become management conscious.
Or that management emerged as a recognizably distinct kind of work, one that could be studied and developed into a discipline—as happened in each of the countries that has exercised economic leadership during the postwar period.

But also, after World War II we began slowly to see that management is not business management.

It pertains to every human effort that brings together in one organization people of diverse knowledge and skills.

And it can be powerfully applied in hospitals, universities, churches, arts organizations, and social service agencies of all kinds.

These “third sector” institutions have grown faster than either business or government in the developed countries since World War II.

The social sector

And their leaders are becoming more and more management conscious.

For even though the need to manage volunteers or raise funds may differentiate nonprofit managers from their for-profit peers, many more of their responsibilities are the same—among them, defining the right strategy and goals, developing people, measuring performance, and marketing the organization’s services.

This is not to say that our knowledge of management is complete.

Management education today is on the receiving end of a great deal of criticism, much of it justified.

What we knew about management 40 years ago—and have codified in our systems of organized management education—does not necessarily help managers meet the challenges they face today.

The Age of Social Transformations is not over yet (continue)

Management Challenges for the 21st Century

Managing in the Next Society

Nevertheless, that knowledge was the foundation for the spectacular expansion the world economy has undergone since 1950, in developed and developing countries alike.
And what has made that knowledge obsolete is, in large measure, its **own success** in hastening the shift from manual work to knowledge work in business organizations.

To take just one example, we now have a great need for **new accounting concepts and methods**.

Experts like Robert Kaplan have pointed out that many of the assumptions on which our system is based are no longer valid.

For example, accounting conventions assume that manufacturing industry is central; in fact, service and information industries are now more important in all developed countries.

They also assume that a business produces just one product, whereas practically all modern businesses produce a great many different products.

But above all, cost accounting, that proud invention of the mid-1920s, assumes that 80 percent of all costs are attributable to direct manual labor.

In reality, manual labor in advanced manufacturing industries today accounts for no more than 8 percent to 12 percent of all costs.

And the processes used in industries like automobiles and steel, in which labor costs are higher, are **distinctly antiquated**.

Efforts to devise accounting systems that will reflect changes like these—and provide accurate managerial information—are under way.

But they are still in the early stages.

So are our efforts to find solutions to other **important management challenges**:

- structures that work for information-based organizations;
- ways to raise the productivity of knowledge workers;
- techniques for managing existing businesses and developing new and very different ones at the same time;
- ways to build and manage truly global businesses;
- and many more.

Management arose in developed countries.
How does its rise affect the developing world?

Perhaps the best way to answer this question is to start with the obvious: management and large enterprise, together with our new communications capacity, have created a truly global economy.

In the process, they have changed what countries must do to participate effectively in that economy and to achieve economic success.

In the past, starring roles in the world’s economy were always based on leadership in technological innovation.

Great Britain became an economic power in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through innovation in the steam engine, machine tools, textiles, railroads, iron making, insurance, and international banking.

Germany’s economic star rose in the second half of the nineteenth century on innovation in chemistry, electricity, electronics, optics, steel, and the invention of the modern bank.

The United States emerged as an economic power at the same time through innovative leadership in steel, electricity, telecommunications, electronics, automobiles, agronomy, office equipment, agricultural implements, and aviation.

But the one great economic power to emerge in this century—Japan—has not been a technological pioneer in any area. (See management as a liberal art and on Japan)

Its ascendancy rests squarely on leadership in management.

The Japanese understood the lessons of America’s managerial achievement during World War II more clearly than we did ourselves especially with respect to managing people as a resource rather than as a cost.

As a result, they adapted the West’s new “social technology” management—to make it fit their own values and traditions.

They adopted (and adapted) organization theory to become the most thorough practitioners of decentralization in the world.

(Pre-World War II Japan had been completely centralized.)

And they began to practice marketing when most American companies were still only preaching it. (about marketing)

Japan also understood sooner than other countries that management and technology
together had **changed the economic landscape.**

The **mechanical model of organization and technology**, which came into being at the end of the seventeenth century when an obscure French physicist, Denis Papin, designed a prototypical steam engine, **came to an end in 1945**, when the first atomic bomb exploded and the first computer went on line.

Since then, the model for both technology and organizations has been a **biological one—interdependent, knowledge intensive, and organized by the flow of information.** *(From Analysis to Perception – The New Worldview)*

One consequence of this change is that the industries that have been the carriers of enterprise for the last 100 years—industries like automobiles, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances—are **in crisis.**

And this is true even where demographics seem to be in their favor.

For example, countries like Mexico and Brazil have an abundant supply of young people who can be trained easily for semiskilled manual work.

The mechanical industries would seem to be a perfect match.

But as competitors in every industrial nation have found, **mechanical production is antiquated unless it becomes automated**—that is, unless it is **restructured around information.**

For that reason alone, **education** is perhaps the **greatest**

**“management”** challenge developing countries face.

Another way to arrive at the same conclusion is to look at a second fact with which developing countries must reckon: the developed countries **no longer need them** as they did during the nineteenth century.

It may be hyperbole to say, as Japan’s leading management consultant, Kenichi Ohmae, has said, that Japan, North America, and Western Europe **can exist by themselves** without **the two-thirds of humanity** who live in developing countries.

But it is a fact that during the last 40 years the countries of this so-called **triad** have become essentially self-sufficient except for petroleum.

They produce more food than they can consume—in glaring contrast to the nineteenth century.

They produce something like three-fourths of all the world’s manufactured goods and services.
And they provide the market for an equal proportion.

This poses an acute problem for developing countries, even very big ones like China and India.

They cannot hope to become important economic powers by tracking the evolution of enterprise and management—that is, by starting with nineteenth and early twentieth century industries and productive processes based mainly on a manual work force.

Demographically they may have no choice, of course.

And maybe they can even begin to catch up.

But can they ever get ahead? I doubt it.

During the last 200 years, no country has become a major economic power by following in the footsteps of earlier leaders.

Each started out with what were, at the time, advanced industries and advanced production and distribution processes.

And each, very fast, became a leader in management.

Today, however, in part because of automation information and advanced technology, but in much larger part because of the demand for trained people in all areas of management, development requires a knowledge base that few developing countries possess or can afford.

How to create an adequate managerial knowledge base fast is the critical question in economic development today.

It is also one for which we have no answer so far.

The problems and challenges discussed so far are largely internal to management and enterprise.

But the most important challenge ahead for management in developed countries is the result of an external change that I first called “pension fund socialism” in my 1976 book, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America.

I am referring, of course, to the shift of the titles of ownership of public companies to the institutional trustees of the country’s employees, chiefly through their pension funds.

Socially this is the most positive development of the twentieth century because it resolves the “social question” that vexed the nineteenth century—the conflict
between “capital” and “labor”—by merging the two.

But it has also created the most violent turbulence for management and managers since they arose a century ago.

For pension funds are the ultimate cause of the explosion of hostile takeovers in the last few years; and nothing has so disturbed and demoralized managers as the hostile takeover.

In this sense, takeovers are only a symptom of the fundamental questions pension fund socialism raises about the legitimacy of management:

To whom are managers accountable?

For what?

What is the purpose and rationale of large, publicly owned enterprises?

In 1986, the last year for which we have figures, the pension funds of America’s employees owned more than 40 percent of U.S. companies’ equity capital and more than two-thirds of the equity capital of the 1,000 largest companies.

The funds of large institutions (businesses, states, cities, public service and nonprofit institutions like universities, school districts, and hospitals) accounted for three-quarters of these holdings.

The funds of individuals (employees of small businesses and the self-employed) accounted for the other fourth.

(Mutual funds, which also represent the savings of wage earners rather than of “capitalists,” hold another 5 percent to 10 percent of the country’s equity capital.)

These figures mean that pension funds are already the primary suppliers of capital in the United States.

Indeed, it is almost impossible to build a new business or expand an existing one unless pension-fund money is available.

In the next few years, the funds’ holdings will become even larger, if only because federal government employees now have a pension fund that invests in equity shares.

Thus, by the year 2000, pension funds will hold at least two thirds of the share capital of all U.S. businesses except the smallest.

Through their pension funds, U.S. employees will be the true owners of the country’s means of production.

The same development, with a lag of about ten years, is taking place in Great Britain, Japan, West Germany, and Sweden.
It is also starting to appear in France, Italy, and the Netherlands. ¶¶¶

This startling development was not foreseen, but it was inevitable the result of several interdependent factors.

First is the shift in income distribution that directs 90 percent or so of the GNP in non-Communist, developed countries into the wage fund. (The figure varies from 85 percent in the United States to 95 percent or more in the Netherlands and Denmark.)

Indeed, economically the “rich” have become irrelevant in developed countries, however much they dominate the society pages and titillate TV viewers.

Even the very rich have actually become much poorer in this century if their incomes are adjusted for inflation and taxation.

To be in the same league as the “tycoon” of 1900, today’s “super-rich” person would need a net worth of at least $50 billion—perhaps even $100 billion and income to match.

A few Arab sheiks may qualify, but surely no one in a developed country. ¶¶¶

At the same time, wage earners’ real incomes have risen dramatically.

Few employees in turn-of-the century America could lay aside anything beyond their mortgage payments or the premiums on funeral insurance.

But since then, the American industrial worker’s real income and purchasing power have grown more than 20 times larger, even though the number of hours worked has dropped by 50 percent.

The same has occurred in all the other industrially developed countries.

And it has happened fastest in Japan, where the real income of industrial workers may now be as much as 30 times what it was 80 years ago. ¶¶¶

Demand for this income is essentially limitless because we are again in the midst of an intensively creative period.

In the 60 years between 1856 and World War I, a technical or social innovation that led almost immediately to a new industry appeared, on average, once every 14 months.

And this entrepreneurial explosion underlay the rise of the tycoons.
We needed people like J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, Sr., Andrew Carnegie, Friedrich Krupp, and the Mitsui family who could finance whole industries out of their private pockets.

Technical and social innovations are coming just as fast today.

And the effect of all this energy is that companies and countries require enormous amounts of capital just to keep up, let alone move ahead amounts that are several orders of magnitude larger than those the tycoons had to supply 80 years ago.

Indeed, the total pretax incomes of America's 1,000 highest income earners would be barely adequate to cover the capital needs of the country's private industry for more than three or four days.

This holds true for all developed countries.

In Japan, for instance, the pretax incomes of the country's 2,000 highest income earners just about equals what the country's private industry invests every two or three days.

These economic developments would have forced us in any event to make workers into "capitalists" and owners of productive resources.

That pension funds became the vehicle—rather than mutual funds or direct individual investments in equity as everyone expected 30 years ago—is the result of the demographic shift that has raised life expectancies in developed countries from age 40 to the mid and late-70s.

The number of older people is much too large, and the years during which they need an income too many, for them to depend on support from their children.

They must rely on monies they themselves have put aside during their earning years—and these funds have to be invested for long stretches of time.

That modern society requires an identity of interest between enterprise and employee was seen very early, not only by pre-Marxist socialists like Saint-Simon and Fourier in France and Robert Owen in Scotland but also by classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

Attempts to satisfy this need through worker ownership of business thus go back more than 150 years.

Without exception, they have failed.

In the first place, worker ownership does not satisfy the workers' basic financial and
economic needs.

It puts all the workers’ financial resources into the business that employs them.

But the workers’ needs are primarily long-term, particularly the need for retirement income many years hence.

So to be a sound investment for its worker-owners, a business has to prosper for a very long time—and only one business out of every 40 or 50 ever does.

Indeed, few even survive long enough.

But worker ownership also destroys companies in the end because it always leads to inadequate capital formation, inadequate investment in research and development, and stubborn resistance to abandonment of outmoded, unproductive, and obsolete products, processes, plants, jobs, and work rules.

Zeiss Optical Works, the oldest worker-owned business around, lost its leadership position in consumer optics to the Americans and the Japanese for just this reason.

Time and again, Zeiss’s worker owners preferred immediate satisfaction—higher wages, bonuses, benefits—to investing in research, new products, and new markets.

Worker ownership underlies the near collapse of industry in contemporary Yugoslavia.

And its shortcomings are so greatly hampering industry in China that the country’s leaders are trying to shift to “contract management,” which will expand managerial autonomy and check the power of “work councils” and worker-owners.

And yet, worker ownership of the means of production is not only a sound concept, it is also inevitable.

**Power follows property**, says the old axiom.

Both James Madison, in the *Federalist Papers*, and Karl Marx took it from the seventeenth century English philosopher, James Harrington, who in turn took it from Aristotle.

It can be found in early Confucian writings as well.

And since property has shifted to the wage earners in all developed countries, power has to follow.

Yet unlike any other worker ownership of the means of production, pension fund socialism maintains the autonomy and accountability of enterprise and management, market freedom, competition, and the ability to change and to innovate.

But **pension fund socialism does not function fully as yet.**

We can solve the financial and economic problems it presents.

We know, for instance, that a pension fund must invest no more than a small fraction of its assets, 5 percent perhaps, in the shares of its own company or of any one company
altogether.

We know quite a bit, though not nearly enough, about how to invest pension fund money.

But we still have to solve the basic sociopolitical problem:

**how to build the accomplished fact of employee ownership into the governance of both pension funds and businesses.**

Pension funds are the legal owners of the companies in which they invest.

But they not only have no “ownership interest”; as trustees for the ultimate beneficiaries, the employees, they also are legally obligated to be nothing but “investors,” and short-term investors at that.

That is why it is worker ownership that has made the hostile takeover possible.

For as trustees, the pension funds must sell if someone bids more than the market price.

Whether hostile takeovers benefit shareholders is a hotly debated issue.

That they have serious economic side effects is beyond question.

The fear of a hostile takeover may not be the only reason American managements tend to subordinate everything—market standing, research, product development, service, quality, innovation—to the short term.

But it is surely a major reason.

Moreover, the hostile takeover is a frontal attack on management and managers.

Indeed, what makes the mere threat of a takeover so demoralizing to managers (especially the middle managers and professionals on whom a business depends for its performance) is the raiders’ barely concealed contempt, which management sees as contempt for wealth-producing work, and their work’s subordination to financial manipulation.

For their part, the raiders and their financial backers maintain that management is solely accountable to the shareholders whatever their wishes, even if those represent nothing more than short-term speculative gains and asset stripping.

This is indeed what the law says.

But the law was written for early nineteenth century business conditions, well before large enterprise and management came into being.

And while every free-market country has similar laws, not all countries hold to them.
In Japan, for instance, custom dictates that larger companies exist mainly for the sake of their employees except in the event of bankruptcy; and Japanese economic performance and even Japanese shareholders have surely not suffered as a result.

In West Germany too, large enterprises are seen as “going concerns,” whose preservation is in the national interest and comes before shareholders’ gains.

Both Japan and Germany have organized an extra-legal but highly effective way to hold business managements accountable, however, in the form of the voting control exercised by the big commercial banks of both countries.

No such system exists in the United States (or the United Kingdom), nor could it possibly be constructed.

And even in Japan and Germany, the hold of the banks is weakening fast.

So we must think through what management should be accountable for; and

how and through whom its accountability can be discharged.

The stockholders’ interest, both short and long-term, is one of the areas, to be sure.

But it is only one.

One thing is clear to anyone with the slightest knowledge of political or economic history: the present day assertion of “absolute shareholder sovereignty” (of which the boom in takeovers is the most spectacular manifestation) is the last hurrah of nineteenth century, basically preindustrial capitalism.

It violates many people’s sense of justice—as the upsurge of “populism” and anti-Wall Street rhetoric in the 1988 presidential campaign attest.

But even more important, no economy can perform if it puts what Thorstein Veblen, some 70 years ago, called “the acquisitive instinct” ahead of the “instinct of workmanship.”

Modern enterprise, especially large enterprise, can do its economic job—including making profits for the shareholders—only if it is being managed for the long run.

Investments, whether in people, in products, in plants, in processing, in technology, or in markets, require several years of gestation before there is even a “baby,” let alone full-grown results.

Altogether far too much in society—jobs, careers, communities depends on the economic fortunes of large enterprises to subordinate them completely to the interests of any one group, including shareholders.
How to make the interests of shareholders—and this means pension funds—compatible with the needs of the economy and society is thus the big issue pension fund socialism has to resolve.

And it has to be done in a way that makes managements accountable, especially for economic and financial performance, and yet allows them to manage for the long term.

How we answer this challenge will decide both the shape and place of management and the structure, if not the survival, of the free-market economy.

It will also determine America’s ability to compete in a world economy in which competitive long-range strategies are more and more the norm.

Finally, what is management?

What does this mean for you? and what will you calendarize is it a bag of techniques and tricks?

A bundle of analytical tools like those taught in business schools?

These are important, to be sure, just as the thermometer and a knowledge of anatomy are important to the physician.

But what the evolution and history of management—its successes as well as its problems—teach is that management is, above all else, a very few, essential principles.

Management as a liberal art, Management, Revised Edition and Cases

To be specific:

1. Management is about human beings.

Its task is to make people capable of joint performance, to make their strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant.

This is what organization is all about, and it is the reason that management is the critical, determining factor.

These days, practically all of us are employed by managed institutions, large and small, business and nonbusiness—and that is especially true for educated people.
We depend on management for our **livelhoods** and our **ability to contribute and achieve**.

Indeed, our **ability to contribute to society** at all usually **depends** as much on the management of the enterprises in which we work as it does on our own skills, dedication, and effort.

2. Because management deals with the **integration of people** in a common venture, it is **deeply embedded in culture**.

**What managers do** in West Germany, in Britain, in the United States, in Japan, or in Brazil is exactly the same.

**How they do it** may be quite different.

Thus one of the basic challenges managers in a **developing country** face is to find and identify those parts of their own tradition, history, and culture that can be used as **building blocks**.

The difference between Japan’s economic success and India’s relative backwardness, for instance, is largely explained by the fact that Japanese managers were able to plant imported management concepts in their own cultural soil and make them grow.

Whether China’s leaders can do the same—or whether their great tradition will become an impediment to the country’s development remains to be seen.

3. Every enterprise requires **simple, clear, and unifying objectives**.

Its **mission** has to be clear enough and big enough to provide a common vision.

The **goals** that embody it have to be clear, public, and often reaffirmed.

We hear a great deal of talk these days about the “culture” of an organization.

But what we really mean by this is the **commitment** throughout an enterprise to some **common** objectives and common values.

Without such commitment there is no enterprise—there is **only a mob**.

**Management’s job** is to **think** through, **set**, and **exemplify** those **objectives**, **values**, and **goals**.

*The manager and the moron*
4. It is also management’s job to **enable** the enterprise and each of its members to **grow** and **develop** as **needs** and **opportunities** change.

This means that every enterprise is a **learning and teaching institution**.

Training and development must be built into it on **all levels**—training and development that **never stop**.

5. Every enterprise is composed of people with **different skills and knowledge** doing many **different kinds of work**.

For that reason, it must be built on **communication** and on **individual responsibility**.

- Each member has to **think through** what he or she aims to **accomplish**—and make sure that associates know and understand that aim.

- Each has to think through what he or she **owes to others**—and make sure that others understand and approve.

- Each has to think through what is needed from others—and make sure that others know what is expected of them.

6. Neither the **quantity of output** nor the **bottom line** is by itself an adequate **measure of the performance of management and enterprise**.

   Market standing, innovation, productivity, development of people, quality, financial results—all are **crucial** to a company’s performance and indeed to its survival.

   In this respect, an enterprise is **like a human being**.

   Just as we need a diversity of measures to **assess the health and performance** of a person, we need a **diversity of measures** for an enterprise.

   Performance has to be **built into the enterprise and its management**; it has to be measured—or at least judged—and it has to be
continuously improved.

7. Finally, the **single most important thing** to remember about any enterprise is that **there are no results inside its walls.**

1. The result of a business is a satisfied customer.
2. The result of a hospital is a healed patient.
3. The result of a school is a student who has learned something and **puts it to work** ten years later.

Inside an enterprise, **there are only** cost centers.

**Results exist only on the outside.**

**Conditions for survival**

About management, as about any other area of human work, much more could be said.

- Tools must be acquired and used.
- Techniques and any number of processes and procedures must be learned.

But managers who **truly understand** the **principles** outlined above and **truly manage themselves in their light** will be achieving, accomplished managers—the kind of managers who **build** successful, productive, and achieving **enterprises** all over the world and who **establish standards, set examples, and leave as a legacy** both **greater capacity to produce wealth and greater human vision.**

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**It is impossible** to work on things that aren’t on your mental radar ↓ **at the right and necessary points in time:**
Intelligence and behavior by Niccolò Machiavelli and Edward de Bono

Calendarization → What do these issues ↑ ↓, these challenges ↑ ↓ mean for me & ... – an alternative

What actions are suggested by the concepts and information in these thought-scapes ↑ ↓? continue

Dense reading accompanied by thinking broad and detailed is needed in creating an effective action approach

The management revolution – making knowledge productive

“That knowledge has become THE resource, rather than a resource, is what makes our society “post-capitalist.”

This change means that we now see knowledge as the essential resource.

Land, labor, and capital are important chiefly as restraints.

Without them, even knowledge cannot produce; with out them, even management cannot perform.

But where there is effective management, that is, application of knowledge to knowledge, we can always obtain the other resources.”

The application of knowledge – a change in the human condition

The social sector – Who takes care of the social challenges of the knowledge society?

Management Challenges for the 21st Century

Managing in the Next Society

“To improve the productivity of knowledge workers will in fact require drastic changes in the structure of the organizations of post-capitalist society, and in the structure of
society itself“

rlaexp.com start → The memo THEY don’t want you to SEE because they want you beholden to them – their prisoner of yesterday.

THEY ↑ are the organization and political power structures trying to extrapolate yesterday – the antithesis of the manager who truly understand (mentioned in paragraph 339 above)

Intelligence and behavior by Niccolò Machiavelli and Edward de Bono

Books by Peter Drucker